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In a previous article in this magazine an attempt was made
to trace historically the development of the veto power of the
governor in Ohio. A few of the legal questions arising out of
the exercise of that power will be discussed here.
I - BE PRESENTED TO THE GOVERNOR
The first sentence in Art. II, Sec. 16 in the Ohio Constitu-
tion reads: "Every bill passed by the general assembly shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor for his
approval." A similar provision is found in practically every
other state constitution.
It becomes necessary at times to fix the exact time or at
least the exact day when such presentation takes place, since
legal consequences are attendant thereon, for another sentence
in that same paragraph reads: "If a bill shall not be returned
by the governor within ten days( Sundays excepted) after be-
ing presented to him it shall become a law in like manner as if
he had signed it."
When then is a bill "presented to the governor"? This pro-
vision has been held to be mandatory and since the constitution
itself gives no answer it is left to judicial interpretation. "It
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might be merely exhibited to that officer" said the California
supreme court "and even if it should be immediately there-
after taken or withdrawn it might be contended that it had
nevertheless been presented within the very letter of the con-
stitution." We would all agree with that court when it adds:
"We would instinctively regard such a presentation as being
fictitious - merely spurious." Especially would such an inter-
pretation be absurd in Ohio where the constitutional provision
reads: "Presented to the governor for his approval."
The question usually arises where the bill.has not been pre-
sented to the governor in person but left in his office in his
absence and the governor claims that he has the full time
allowed by the constitution for his consideration after it has
come to him in person. The Massachusetts court has consistently
upheld this contention. In Dimich v. Barry (211 Mass. i66)
that court said: "The act of the legislative body does not begin
to run until the legislative act has come to him in fact and no
constructive or implied action falling short of a physical putting
before him suffices." Several courts have cited the Massachu-
setts court's position with approval but more courts have fav-
ored the opinioi of the New Hampshire court in the Soldiers
Voters Case (4-5 N.H. 6i1) which says: "When was this bill
presented to the governor? If there can be no presentation
of a bill until it is put into his own hands, then it was not pre-
sented until Thursday, August i8th. But it would be absurd
to hold that the officers of the senate and house of representa-
tives are obliged to order to perform their duty to follow the
governor wherever he may chance to go ** and present bills to
him in person."
There are few clear cut decisions upon this question. Most
of the opinions as Oliver P. Field has said (56 Am. Law Re-
view 898), savor more of policy than of law. He suggests that
it might be wise for constitution makers to put at rest the con-
flict of opinion which exists upon this point.
The most satisfactory decision is that of the Kentucky su-
preme court in a fairly recent opinion (Cammack, Atty. Gen. v.
Harris, 234 Ky. 846). The facts of the case are interesting and
show how this question often arises. The statutes of Kentucky
provide that it shall be lawful to close all public offices on Sat-
urday afternoons, but it was the practice of the governor to be
in his office these afternoons. On Saturday, March 8th, 1930,
the clerk of the House at 3 P. Ai. delivered to the office of the
governor a bill, but found the office dosed. Not obtaining ad-
mission, he announced in a voice loud enough to have been heard
within, that the clerk of the house of representatives was there
and had with him House Bill No. 559 and desired to deliver
it to the governor for his approval or disapproval. The gov-
ernor was in his office until z o'clock when he told his staff that
on account of the adjourning of the legislature and the conse-
quent volume of business on Monday, he would suggest that
the office be closed for the rest of the day. The governor left
the office about 2:30 P. Ni. and went for a ride through the city.
Monday, the ioth, the bill was again presented to the office of
the governor, but his secretary who was authorized to receive
bills refused under instructions from the governor to accept
the bill because of a notation on the bill that it had been pre-
sented March 8th. On the I2th the bill was again presented
and this time received by the governor. On March 2oth the
governor vetoed the bill. If there was a presentation on March
8th the veto was void because of its being made more than ten
days after presentation. The court upheld the veto on the
ground that there was no presentation on March 8th, saying:
"No method of presentation being given, it is for the courts to
determine when the provision has been complied with. The
court is not inclined to undertake the establishment of a fixed
rule of procedure or to define the term, preferring rather to
decide each case as it may arise according to the particular cir-
cumstances. There being no indication that the governor or his
authorized agents were evading presentation of the bill, due
consideration to the usual manner of transacting business be-
tween individuals with an honesty of purpose to cooperate
harmoniously impels the court to the conclusion that the bill
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was not presented to the governor on March 8th in a way in-
tended by the constitution or in a manner sanctioned by ordi-
nary business practice."
Sometimes the determination of the time of presentation
is made a question of proof-of the admissibility of parol evi-
dence to contradict an official record. It became such in an
unusual case in Ohio. Governor Pattison, elected in 1905, was
desperately ill at the time of his inauguration and never func-
tioned as governor thereafter. For a long time before his death
he was practically unconscious. In the meantime bills were
being passed by the general assembly and sent to the governor's
office where they were recorded in the "governor's book" as
having been presented to the governor. This book was pro-
vided for by statute though there was nothing in the statute
specifically requiring recording in this book the time or fact of
presentation of bills to the governor. An attempt was made by
parol evidence to contradict this record and to show that due
to the well known physical condition of the governor no bill
had or could have been presented to him for his approval. This
evidence the Ohio supreme court (Wrade v. Richardson, 77
Ohio St. 18I) held was inadmissible. The court was careful
to put its decision on this ground. "It may, however, be use-
ful," says Judge Shauck, "to add that the foregoing observa-
tions are intended to be restricted to the requirements of the
present case. We do not consider whether in the absence of the
records in the office of the governor the fact of presentation to
the governor should not be regarded as established by the legis-
lative journals and the records of the secretary of state." The
Ohio supreme court seems to make the matter of the time and
fact of presentation one entirely to be determined by official
records and is not disturbed by the fact that it knew as everyone
else knew that the mandatory provision of the constitution in
regard to presentation of bills to the governor for his approval
was in this instance being totally denied.
OHIO EXECUTIVE VETO
II- GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY ADJOURNMENT
PREVENTS ITS RETURN
In Art. II, Sec. 16 is another sentence, part of which has
already been quoted, in regard to the veto power which needs
interpretation. This sentence reads: "If a bill shall not be re-
turned after being presented to him, it shall become a law in like
manner as if he had signed it unless the general assembly by
adjournment prevents its return, in which case it shall become
a law unless within ten days after such adjournment it shall be
filed by him with his objections in writing in the office of the
secretary of state."
What is meant by the clause "unless the general assembly by
adjournment prevents its return"? Does this mean final ad-
journment only, or does it include a case where the general
assembly has recessed or adjourned for a limited period of time,
and during the recess, when the general assembly is not in active
session the ten days allowed the governor for consideration has
expired? Has the general assembly in this situation by its ad-
journment prevented the return of the bill by the governor?
The supreme court of Alabama in ex rel Crenshaw v. Joseph
(175 Ala. 579) states that the authorities are unanimous in
holding that the adjournment by the legislatures contemplated
in a constitutional provision of the kind is a final adjournment.
As is so often the case when a court talks about the authorities
being unanimous, a little investigation would have shown that
such was not the case. A few states follow an opinion to the
contrary expressed in the leading case of In re Public Utility
Board (83 N.J.L. 303). In spite of a statement, however, of
the U. S. Supreme Court that the decisions among the state
courts on this point are in great conflict there can be no doubt
that the Tennessee decision represents the great weight of
authority among the state courts. Said the Minnesota supreme
court in State ex rel Putnam v. Holm (172 Minn. 162), "The
New Jersey case is not now, nor was it at the time it was written,
in accord with the prevailing rule. It did not mention the sev-
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eral prior contrary decisions of the courts. The prevailing rule
is that a temporary adjournment of the legislature or of a house
in which a bill originated does not prevent the return of the
bill." The Ohio supreme court has not decided the question
for Ohio but there is an opinion of the attorney general given in
i9i9 in response to an inquiry from Governor Cox. Said the
attorney general, "The word adjournment as used in Sec. 16
of Article II of the State Constitution means the final adjourn-
ment of the general assembly. During a temporary adjourn-
ment of both houses of the general assembly to a day beyond
the time within which the Governor is required to return a bill
which he does not approve, the governor in case he desires to
exercise his veto power should return the bill with his objections
in writing to the clerk of the house in which the bill originated
within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it has been presented
to him for approval. A return to the clerk during such adjourn-
ment is a return to the house within the meaning of section 16
of Article II."
The question would seem therefore to be settled were it not
for an important recent decision of the U. S. supreme court
involving a similar provision of the federal constitution. The
case is that of Okonogan Indians v. U. S. (279 U. S. 655) de-
cided in 1929 and arose over the question whether an interim
adjournment of congress at the end of the first session was an
adjournment which made legal a pocket veto because of the
fact that such an adjournment prevented the return of a bill
by the president to the house of its origin. The court, holding
that the interim adjournmnt had this effect stresses the fact that
"this view is supported by the practical construction given to the
constitutional provision by the president through a long course
of years in which congress has acquiesced." It also notes that
congress has never enacted a statute authorizing an officer or
agent of either house to receive bills returned by the president
during this adjournment and there is no rule to that effect in
either house. It also thinks important the provision that when
the president has returned a bill to the house of its origin that
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house shall enter its objections at large on the journal and pro-
ceed to consider it. For these and other reasons ably presented
by Justice Sanford the court comes to the conclusion that, "from
a consideration of the entire clause we think the 'House' to
which the bill is to be returned is the House in session. *** It
follows in our opinion that under the constitutional mandate
it is to be returned to the house when sitting in an organized
capacity for the transaction of business *** and that no return
can be made to the house when it is not in session as a collective
body and its members are dispersed."
The reasoning leading to the conclusion that only a "final"
adjournment prevents a return of a bill by the executive is found
in the decision of the supreme court of Tennessee in the case
of Johnson City v. Eastern Electric Co (33 Tenn. 632) which
says, "if the return must be made to the House when a quorum
of its membership is present, then the meaning of the phrase
in the above section 'unless the general assembly by its adjourn-
ment prevents its return' is that any adjournment which would
result in the absence of a quorum would be such an adjourn-
ment as would prevent the return of a bill and therefore it
would result that the governor could not return a bill if the
house in which it originated had adjourned for midday lunch-
eon or had adjourned at night until the next morning." This
court analyzes the few cases holding the contrary view and finds
that the "conflict is very slight if it may be said to exist." It
concludes: "There is no warrant in the constitution for the idea
that a session of the general assembly ends with each temporary
adjornment. If the intent of the framers of the constitution had
been that a mere temporary adjournment of the house in which
a bill originated could prevent its return by the governor within
the time limited no reason can be imagined for their failure to
express the idea in plain terms. The words 'general assembly'
should have been omitted if such was the intent and the words
'the house in which the bill originated' should have been sub-
stituted in lieu." The point made by the U. S. supreme court
that no constitutional or statutory provision is made for agents
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of either house receiving a bill returned by the president is
answered by saying: "The house in which a bill originates is a
parliamentary body and must so far as the manual possession
of its journals, bills ** and the like be represented by agents. :
Although a house in which a bill originated might be an open
session ** it could only gain knowledge of the fact that the bill
was returned by the governor through the manual act of some
agent of the house. In other words, if the bill should be re-
turned by the governor with his objection to the house in which
it originated, while the house was in open session, the messenger
from the governor would doubtless deliver manual possession
of the bill to the clerk of the house, to the speaker of the house,
or to some member of the committee on enrolled bills and by
means of this individual agency so selected the house would
gain intelligence of the fact that the bill had been returned.
These considerations demonstrate that it could not have been
the intent of the framers that the return of the bill could only
be made while the house in which the bill originated was in
open meeting with a quorum present. Nothing could be accom-
plished by a return of this character which could not be equally
well accomplished in any one of the other modes above indi-
cated."
The Minneapolis supreme court in 1927 in State ex el Palt-
nam v. Holm (172 Minn. 162) agrees with the Tennessee court
in thinking that "there is no substantial reason for a bill being
returned to the house while in actual session." - The presid-
ing officer, secretary (or derk) and members of either house
are its authorized representatives. Each member is an agent
of the particular house to the extent of being a proper person
to whom the governor may make such a return."
In determining which view to follow the federal supreme
court furnishes the proper test in saying "We think that under
the constitutional provision the determinative question in ref-
erence to an 'adjournment' of congress is not whether it is a
final adjournment or an interim adjournment but whether
it is one that 'prevents' the president from returning a bill to
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the house in which it originated within the time allowed." It
also speaks of the decisions in state courts as not being helpful
"due as they were in some part to differences in phraseology
or their application to the procedure of the state legislature."
Following this method of approach it may not be difficult
to reconcile the two views, for the fact situation in the federal
and state cases is very different. The federal supreme court
is talking about an adjournment at the end of the first session
of congress, while in the state decisions the discussion is about
an interim adjournment for a relatively brief period of time,
during the regular session. In the federal legislative procedure
there are two sessions of each congress corresponding to the two
year term. The statutes at large classify the statutes passed as
belonging to the first or second session. In a very real sense
then the adjournment of the first session of congress has about
it a sense of finality which does not exist in the brief interim
adjournments of a state legislature. It would seem, therefore,
entirely reasonable to say as does the federal supreme court
that when congress adjourns its first session and its members all
go home to return at a date permanently fixed by the constitu-
tion unless congress "shall by law appoint a different day" it is
such an adjournment as prevents the president making a return
with his veto of a bill to the house of its origin. Would the
court have said the same thing about an adjournment of con-
gress from Friday morning until Monday morning if the ten
days allowed the president had elapsed on Saturday? A literal
interpretation of the constitution would compel the legislative
body to remain in continuous active session for the executive
need not wait for ten days to return the bill but may do so at
any time after it has been presented to him and if the legislature
should adjourn for a day or even for lunch as suggested by the
Tennessee court, the executive might desire to return it at that
time and claim that he was prevented from doing so because the
legislative body was adjourned. This of course is not a reason-
able interpretation but it does show that to prevent by adjourn-
ment a return there must be a total impossibility of such return.
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Another difference in the fact situation is seen in the state-
ment of the federal supreme court that its view "is supported
by the practical construction given to the constitutional provision
by the president through a long course of years in which con-
gress has acquiesced." The practical construction given the
similar provision in the Ohio Constitution by its governor has
until this year been the opposite.
Governor Cox in his inquiry to the attorney general in 1919
referred to above makes this clear when he says, "with regard
to certain bills filed with me for consideration on the i6th of
April, I may desire to exercise the power of disapproval con-
ferred on me by Sec. i6 of Art. II of the Constitution. If at all
consistent with my proper course of procedure under the section
referred to I want to make certain that the right of the general
assembly to renew my action shall be preserved. As you know
the legislature adjourned on April 17th and will not convene
until the 5th of May next."
It was as stated above in answer to this inquiry that the
attorney general ruled that an interim adjournment did not
prevent a return of the bill to the legislature:
A still more fundamental difference in the fact situation is
seen in the difference between the federal attitude and the Ohio
attitude toward the executive veto.
It has been said that the wording of the Ohio and the fed-
eral constitution about adjournment is identical. The results,
however, are different. In the federal constitution the effect
is -to kill the bill unless signed by the president. In the Ohio
constitution the effect is to make the bill a law unless vetoed
by the governor. The difference may not be great but it does
show a difference in attitude toward adjournment and veto.
The federal constitution accepts the death of bills left in the
hands of the executive at the time of adjournment. The Ohio
constitution assumes no such result but rather the opposite and
puts the burden on the governor.
This reluctance to accept an absolute veto by the governor
in Ohio is borne out by the history of the veto power. For over
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a hundred years as pointed out before no veto power was pro-
vided for. When first given it was with the proviso that in case
it was exercised after adjournment it should be filed with his
reasons with the secretary of state who should present it to the
next session of the general assembly. When the present veto
provision was adopted by the convention of 19.12 it was to limit
the veto power then existing, not to enlarge it. The provision
about his veto, filed in the office of the secretary of state, being
presented for approval to the next general assembly was omitted
because it was felt that it had proved to be unworkable, and
every reason given to show that it was unworkable was based
upon the idea that in every case of such a "filing" there had been
a final adjournment. In debating this provision in the conven-
tion the following discussion took place:
MR. WOODS:
When the governor vetoes a bill after the general assembly ad-
journs, what becomes of the bill?
MR. DoTY:
They have never found out what they do with it. The governor,
I believe, sends it up to the next house or senate, as the case may be,
in the next general assembly.
MR. WOODS:
Can they not act on it?
MR. DOTY:
You know as a lawyer that they cannot. You have to return it
to the house in which it originated. When the legislature has adjourned
and when it is sent back to the next general assembly in which it orig-
inated it is out of existence.
Again in discussing the proposed veto amendment:
MR. JOHNSON:
No, there is nothing arbitrary about the veto unless the general
assembly should rush some bills through at the end of the session so that
the governor could not report it before adjournment. ** What is an
absolute veto? It is one that cannot be overcome. The governor has
no veto of that kind as proposed in the amendment.
MR. DOTY:
The general assembly adjourns today at noon sine die. ** The leg-
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islature having adjourned sine die will have no chance to review the
governor's veto.
MR. JOHNSON:
The legislature has the remedy in its hands of refusing to sign any
laws during the last ten days of the session.
When we realize that aside from the debate over the ques-
tion whether there should be any executive veto at all, the main
debate in the convention of 191i was whether an absolute veto
was- inadvertently being given under a possible situation and
that the only possible situation conjured up by Mr. Doty, who
was raising the spectre of a possible absolute veto power was
after a final adjournment, we realize that there could not pos-
sibly have been any intent to confer such an absolute power of
veto after a temporary adjournment when a date was fixed for
reconvening within a short time. There is a vast difference be-
tween this background and that seen in the federal constitutional
convention of 1787 when the debate over the executive veto was
whether it should be an absolute veto power or the one now
provided for.
For these important differences between the fact situation
in Ohio and in the federal government it is not unreasonable
to say of the federal decision as it says of the state decisions that
"it is not very helpful in deciding the question" as it arises in
this state and that when the question comes before the Ohio
supreme court for settlement it will be justified in following
the reasoning of the various state courts and the opinion of its
attorney general.
The above discussion has a very vital bearing upon the ques-
tion of the legality of an important recent veto of the governor
of Ohio and the conclusion if sound would mean that the veto
was void.
The special session of the general assembly of Ohio recessed
January 28th, 1936, until February 25th. The sundries appro-
priation bill was received by the governor January 28th. When
the ten days allowed by the constitution for consideration was
up, the general assembly was not in active session and the
members were dispersed. The governor, believing that under
the circumstances he was prevented from returning the bill to
the house of its origin filed the bill with his approval, but with
various "items" vetoed, in the office of the secretary of state,
thus preventing the items vetoed being repassed by the general
assembly; in effect amounting to an absolute veto. The validity
of this veto will of course depend upon whether the reasoning
of the federal supreme court or that of the state supreme court
is followed.
An additional argument could be made to justify this filing
and that is that this bill was a bill approved and therefore had
to be filed under the wording of Art. 16 that "if he approves
he shall sign it and thereupon it shall become a law and be filed
with the secretary of state." Since the bill presented to the
governor, it is argued, is one bill and cannot be divided and
since the bill is generally approved, the approved bill must be
filed and carries along with it the items vetoed. The wording of
the constitution is unfortunate, but the meaning is dear. "Items
so disapproved shall be void unless repassed in the manner
herein prescribed for the repassing of a bill" reads the provision.
The above argument proves too much for it would render this
provision inoperative since no item vetoes would ever have to
be returned, being always parts of bills generally approved.
The constitution does not make the filing essential to the going
into effect of a bill approved but it does require that an oppor-
tunity be given to reconsider vetoed items. It does not specify
when an approved bill shall be filed or by whom. The constitu-
tion moreover does not require that the bill must be returned
but only that the "item or items so disapproved shall be void
unless repassed in the manner prescribed for the repassage of a
bill." It would therefore be proper for the governor to return
the bill with the items vetoed to the house of its origin, for
action by that house on the items vetoed and after such action
the bill approved could be filed in the office of the secretary of
state, or it would be equally proper for the governor, by mes-
sage, to inform the house of its origin of his action on the bill
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and the items vetoed so that having the item vetoes officially
before it, a repassing might be made "in the manner prescribed
for the repassage of a bill." Only in some such manner is it
possible for the constitutional mandate making it necessary for
an opportunity to repass vetoed items to be carried out.
This argument would seem, therefore, to have no force and
makes the question of the validity of the governor's veto of the
items in the sundries appropriation bill depend entirely upon
whether the reasoning of the federal or state courts is followed.
If the argument is sound that the reasoning of the state courts
to the effect that adjournment means only final adjournment
ought to be followed in Ohio, then the veto was void.
While this is so it is also so that the supreme court of Ohio
is very loath to disagree with a conclusion reached by the federal
supreme court and might be inclined to follow it even though
the important differences between the federal and Ohio situa-
tion were recognized.
Some significance also should be given to the fact that the
governor's veto under discussion was not protested but was by
its silence accepted by the general assembly. It cannot be said
therefore that the entire practice in Ohio has been to the con-
trary. It is true that until this veto and its tacit acceptance the
practice was to the contrary. It is believed no such veto was ever
filed before and the accepted practice in Ohio is expressed in
the refusal of Governor Cox under advice of his attorney gen-
eral to so act. Since the federal supreme court gives consider-
able weight to the accepted federal practice in the matter, the
very fact that the veto was not protested has some bearing upon
its validity, though a single veto not protested cannot be said
to establish a practice especially when the previous established
practice was to the contrary.
OHIO EXECUTIVE VETO
III- TEN DAYS AFTER ADJOURNMENT
The clause in Art. XVI which reads "in which case it shall
become a law -unless weithin ten days after such adjournment it
shall be filed by him with his objections in writing in the office
of the secretary of state" will some day have to be given, by
our supreme court, a definite meaning particularly that part
which fixes "ten days after adjournment" as the limit of time
for a veto.
Ordinarily no question would arise for all such bills are
usually presented to the governor at or immediately after the
time of adjournment and the governor has the full ten days for
consideration. Sometimes, however, this is not the case. Many
bills are passed on the last day of the session. There may be
delay on the part of the legislative officials in getting the bill
presented to the governor. Does the governor have the full
ten days after adjournment? Even more serious is the situation
where the legislature by the device of stopping the dock pro-
longs the session after the official time of adjournment. The
journals of the two houses record the adjournment at a certain
time on a certain day. As a matter of fact the legislature, the
clock being stopped, remains in session hours and sometimes
days after such official time of adjournment, continuing to pass
bills and do other business. The time of presentation of a bill
to the governor may under these circumstances be days after
the official adjournment so if the governor must exercise his
veto within ten days after such official adjournment he does not
have anywhere near his ten days for consideration. As a matter
of fact the legislature may remain in actual session ten days or
more after official adjournment in which case if the ten-day
clause is literally followed, the ten-day period is up before the
governor even gets the bill and his veto power is completely
denied. To give this interpretation to the clause would more-
over, in effect, make another clause of the same article inopera-
tive, viz., the clause which reads: "Every bill passed by the
general assembly shall before it becomes a law be presented to
the governor for his approval."
273
274 LAW JOURNAL -J UNE, 1937
Since the veto power is held to be a part of the legislative
function it would follow that presentation to the governor for
his approval is as necessary to the enactment of a law as is its
passage by the legislature. It would seem therefore that a
sensible construction would be one that would attempt to con-
strue the article as a whole and to enforce all its provisions.
This could be done by holding the clause "ten days after ad-
journment" to be apposite to a situation where the bill being in
the governor's hands and under his examination, the general
assembly adjourns.
In this case he would have ten days after such adjournment.
There is no apparent purpose for ever denying the governor
ample time for consideration of a bill. Ample time in this
article is defined to be ten days. The intent of the clause must
therefore be to increase under some circumstances the time
allowed for examination but never to decrease it. This interpre-
tation is borne out by the structure of the veto paragraph. It
reads "if a bill shall not be returned by the governor within ten
days ** after being presented to him it shall become a law."
This, of course, has in mind a situation where the legislature
is in session and then realizing that within this ten-day period
the legislature might adjourn, it provides in the same sentence
that in such a case "it shall become a law unless within ten days
after such adjournment it shall be filed by him," etc.
This would seem to be a plausible interpretation and sen-
sible in its results. There are, however, some defects in its
reasoning. If this clause applies only to a situation where the
bill is in the governor's hands, while the legislature is in ses-
sion, what about the situation where bills are passed, as so many
are, on the last day of the session and the bills so passed are
not presented to the governor until after adjournment? No
provision is then made for the situation. It might be argued,
however, that, since all bills before they become laws must be
presented to the governor for his approval, these bills must be
so presented, and though no specified time is fixed within which
his approval or disapproval must be exercised, a reasonable
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time must be allowed, and since the constitution fixes ten days
as being a reasonable time in case the bill comes to him while
the legislature is in session, a similar period by analogy should
be allowed when the bill comes to him after the session is over.
This kind of reasoning by analogy is used by many courts in
interpreting the clause, "unless the congress (legislature) by
their adjournment prevent its return in which case it shall not
be a law." Many courts as seen in the previous article have
construed these clauses as still giving the executive the power
to sign bills after such adjournment but only by analogy within
the time provided for such signing while the legislature is in
session.
Satisfactory as this interpretation of the words "ten days
after adjournment" would seem to be, it has not apparently
received the approval of the few courts that have had occasion
to discuss it nor does it seem to have been the idea of the mem-
bers of the convention of 1912 who framed it. In the debate
upon the veto proposal the question arose as to whether or not
a power of absolute veto was being given the governor on bills
coming to him after adjournment. Mr. Doty, a member of the
convention, who had also been for several years clerk of the
house of representatives and so familiar with the practice of
stopping the clock and the passing of many bills at the last
moment said, "The general assembly adjourns today at noon
sine die. The governor has ten days from today at noon to
approve or veto." In spite of the fact that the convention was
talking about bills that could not be presented to the governor
until after adjournment no disapproval of the remarks of Mr.
Doty was expressed. The ten-day period after adjournment
seems to have been accepted by them as applying to all bills
regardless of the time of presentation to the governor.
The decided cases upon the question are few in number, but
what there are seem to support this view. In Dow v. Biedelman
(49 Ark. 325) that court says, "He (governor) is prevented
by the adjournment from returning the bill, whether the bill is
in his hands before it adjourns or reaches his hands afterwards."
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This case also holds that the veto must be exercised within the
time fixed by the constitution, in this case it being twenty days
after adjournment. In an annotation in 70 A.L.R. 1426 of the
case of Prevestin v. Developing Co. (i 12 Conn. 129) we find
this statement: "The time within which the governor of a state
may, after the adjournment of the legislature, approve a bill
passed by it cannot be extended by delay in presenting a bill
to him."
The leading and really the only case directly in point is that
of Capito v. Topping (65 W. Va. 587) decided in 19o9. In
this case the court -is considering the validity of a veto by the
governor filed within the period of five days after the actual
date of final adjournment but one day more than five days after
the date of the official adjournment as recorded in the legisla-
tive journals. The constitution of West Virginia is the same as
that of Ohio except five days is allowed after adjournment in-
stead of ten. Holding this veto to be invalid as exceeding the
time allowed by the constitution the court said: "The common
practice of staying the hands of the clock to enable a legislature
to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by
the constitution for the expiration of the term is dwelt upon in
the argument as a serious trespass upon the rights of the execu-
tive in respect to the time allowed him for examination and ac-
tion upon bills undisposed of by him at the time of adjourn-
ment; it being pointed out that he might be deprived of the
entire period of five days. In point of fact no such serious cur-
tailment of this period has ever occurred in this state. * If it
should, the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that
of altering the probative force and character of legislative rec-
ords. ** The constitution was adopted by the people with full
knowledge of the existence of this rule of evidence and no pro-
vision was inserted to protect the governor from its operation
and effect."
When-the question comes before the Ohio supreme court, as
it surely will, the court might do one of four things.
i. It might look back of the records of the legislative jour-
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nals and admit parol evidence to determine the actual date of
adjournment. This is just what the West Virginia supreme
court refused to do and it is almost equally certain that the Ohio
supreme court would make the same decision. As pointed out
before, it was decided in Wrade v. Richardson (77 Ohio St.
181) that parol evidence was inadmissible to refute the record
in the governor's office as to the time a bill was presented to
the governor. And in State ex rel Herron v. Smith (44 Ohio
St. 348) it was held that parol evidence could not be admitted
to impeach the official record of the legislative journal that a
bill had received a concurrence of the number of members re-
quired (5) for its adoption. One wonders how far the courts
are willing to carry this doctrine of the conclusiveness of legis-
lative journal records. Suppose the clock is stopped and the
legislature continues to pass bills. Criminal statutes are passed.
In Ohio such laws do not go into effect upon passage but it is
entirely possible to provide that they would. Would a man be
found guilty of a crime which was no crime when the act was
done under the conclusive presumption from the records that
the law was in effect several days before it was really passed.
There is an instance recorded in the English State Trials where
the doctrine that an act of Parliament took effect from the be-
ginning of the session was used to convict a man of capital
offense though the act defining the crime was passed after the
deed was done. Of course such a happening would be impos-
sible in Ohio today.
2. It might accept what has been outlined above as being a
plausible interpretation with sensible results, viz., that the ten
days' limitation after adjournment only applies to a situation
where the bill is in the hands of the governor while the legis-
lature is in session and while in his hands and before the ten
days allowed is up the legislature adjourns. This interpretation
would allow the governor sometimes more than ten days for
consideration but never less.
3. It might follow the reasoning of the West Virginia
court and enforce the provision literally believing, in case leg-
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islative abuse made ineffective the veto power of the governor,
the remedy was in the people and not in the courts.
4. It might accept still another view. One expressed in an
interesting case in Arkansas (Monroe v. Green, 71 Ark. 527).
The Arkansas constitution allowed five days for consideration
by the governor while the legislature was in session and twenty
days after adjournment if by adjournment a return of the bill
was presented. In this case the record showed that the legisla-
ture adjourned April 29th. One hundred bills were left unen-
grossed at the time of final adjournment. Not until May 23rd
was the bill in proper form presented to the governor. The
twenty-day period after adjournment was passed so the court
held the time limit for a veto was passed but since the bill was
not presented to the governor in time to give him at least the
five days fixed by the constitution as a reasonable time for con-
sideration, the other provision in the constitution about the
necessity of bills "being presented to the governor" was not met
and so the bill failed to become a law. There was a dissenting
opinion which took the position that were the case de novo it
should be held that in no case could a bill become a law unless
the presentation was made before final adjournment. If this
theory of interpretation of the case should be followed the
provision in the Ohio constitution would require the veto to be
filed within ten days after adjournment but would also require
the bill to be in the hands of the governor for his consideration
a reasonable time before the ten days is up. If the reasoning
of the Arkansas* court is followed that the time fixed in the
constitution for consideration when the bill is before the gov-
ernor while the legislature is in session is the conclusive test of
what is a reasonable time, then the bill must in Ohio be before
the governor ten days, which would mean that no bills could
be presented to him after final adjournment, which of course
would make impossible any passing of bills in the interim be-
tween official and actual times of adjournment under the device
of "stopping the clock."
Should it be objected that this interpretation would result
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in many bills which had passed both houses, oftentimes import-
ant bills like the appropriation bills, failing to become laws it
could be answered in the language of the supreme court of Con-
necticut cited above (I 12 Conn. 129). "If in addition legisla-
tive practices may have crept in as the attorney general asserts
making approval difficult or impractical these may not be used
as excuses for their perpetuation but should be corrected to the
end that the constitutional provisions should be carried out."
The discussion above about the meaning of the words "ten days
after such adjournment" has a very definite bearing upon the
question of the validity of another of the governor's recent
vetoes. This veto was that of certain items in the general ap-
propriation bill (H.B. 531) for the biennium ending Decem-
ber 31, 1936.
The general assembly officially adjourned May 23rd, 1935,
and the journals of both houses record this as the date of ad-
journment. As a matter of fact by the device of stopping the
clock on that day the general assembly remained in session
until June 4th. The extent of business done after May 23rd is
seen in the fact that the senate journal for May 23rd extends
from page 765 to page 895. Among the bills passed during
this period was the important general appropriation bill. The
record shows that it was passed May 23rd, that being the official
day of adjournment. It was in fact passed June 4th and was not
presented to the governor until some time later. The governor,
convinced that under the constitution he had ten days for con-
sideration after presentation, took the full ten days and filed
his approval of the bill with many important items vetoed on
June I Sth. This was within ten days after presentation but
more than three weeks after the official date of adjournment.
Did this veto meet the requirement of Art. II, Sec. 16, which
reads "in which case it shall become a law unless within ten
days after such adjournment it shall be filed by him with his
objections in writing in the office of the secretary of state"?
The answer to this question will depend of course upon
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which one or ones of the four possible interpretations suggested
above is followed.
It might follow the first interpretation and, ignoring the
official record, find out for itself by other evidence what the
real date of adjournment was. This is exactly what the West
Virginia supreme court in the case discussed above refused to
do and it is not likely that the Ohio supreme court.would do so
either. The holdings so far are against it but it may become
necessary some time for the court to modify these holdings. At
the present time this very question is in the courts. A special
session of the general assembly recessed July 22nd, 1936, for a
technical five-minute recess and stopped the dock. Under a
gentleman's agreement, however, members decided not to re-
turn until called by the presiding officers. The general assembly
did not meet until December 8th and when they did meet on
that date the official record showed it was still July 22nd. They
could at that time have adopted a motion to adjourn to Decem-
ber 8th, but this would have prevented the members from re-
ceiving weekly mileage allowances from and to their homes.
Instead the record was made to show that they met and ad-
journed twice a week during one hundred and forty days of
actual recess and for the coming to and going from these myth-
ical sessions the members claimed mileage allowances. They
felt, it must be said, some moral justification for this claim, since
the many extra sessions had kept them in Columbus such a
length of time that the salary allowed was not sufficient to meet
their expenses. The members of the general assembly in thus
fixing the journal records were of course relying upon the re-
peated holding of our supreme court that such record cannot
be contradicted by other evidence. However the attorney gen-
eral wrote to the state auditor the following, "Although it is
not ordinarily the duty of the auditor to look behind the house
and senate journals in matters of this nature the instant case
appears to me to be such a flagrant attempt to unlawfully with-
draw from the treasury $2i,ooo of the taxpayers' money, it is
my advice to you that* jou are perfectly justified and it is your
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duty to refuse to pay such alleged mileage unless and until you
are ordered to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction."
Experience in some other fields may point the way if it
seems desirable to modify this doctrine. For a long time the
conclusiveness of a sheriff's return was accepted and in some
states is still followed but as Mr. Sunderland says in 30 Colum-
bia Law Review 298, "It thus appears that the common law
rule is fast disappearing from our jurisprudence and that the
courts have been much more effective reformers than the legis-
latures." It is interesting to note that at the time of writing
this article by Mr. Sutherland ( 1916) West Virginia, which in
the case discussed above so strongly refused to question the con-
clusiveness of a legislative journal record as to the date of
adjournment, was one of the few remaining states which held
to the doctrine that the "return of the sheriff cannot be con-
tradicted under any circumstances." (Talbot v. Oil Co., 6o
W. Va. 423). Ohio, on the other hand, has held (Grody v.
Gosline and Barbour 48 Ohio St. 665) the other way.
The statutory experience in Ohio also shows a tendency to-
ward this realistic approach. Ohio G.C. 11656 which, until
1927, read "Such lands and tenements within this county where
the judgment is rendered shall be bound for its satisfaction from
the first day of the term at which it is rendered **", has been
amended (I 12 Ohio St. 199) to read "shall be bound for its
satisfaction from the day on which such judgment is rendered."
Even, however, if our supreme court should reverse itself
and follow the first interpretation suggested it would not help
settle the question under discussion since the governor's veto
was more than ten days after the date even of actual adjourn-
ment.
It might follow the second interpretation suggested and if
it did it would of course uphold the veto.
If it should agree with the West Virginia court and accept
the third interpretation, it would of necessity hold that the
veto was void.
If it should follow the reasoning of the Arkansas Court (71
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Ark. 527) it would hold that not only was the veto void but
that the entire appropriation bill was void as well since the
requirement in the constitution that all bills "must be presented
to the governor for his approval" was not complied with.
As said above, in spite of the authority to the contrary, it is
believed that the second interpretation suggested is the most
sensible one and should be adopted by our supreme court. If
it is not and the words of the constitution are literally followed
as the third interpretation suggests, then it is believed that the
fourth interpretation should of necessity be followed also.
If this reasoning is sound then the cburt should hold either
that the veto was valid or, if not, that the entire appropriation
bill was void.
ITEM VETOES
One other provision in Art. II needs brief mention and that
is the one which reads: "The governor may disapprove any
item or items in any bill making an appropriation of money and
the item or items so disapproved shall be void unless repassed
in the manner herein prescribed for the repassage of a bill."
In argument before the supreme court in the case of State
ex rel v. Cont. Bd. (130 Ohio St. 127) it was urged that an ap-
propriation in a bill of a bulk sum to such a large purpose as
"personal services" did not make it possible for the governor
to exercise his power to veto items. This was said in justification
of the governor's veto of other items with the expectation that
the controlling board would transfer funds from "personal ser-
vice" to the items vetoed, in this way compelling a reduction in
the amount appropriated to personal services. In no other way
it was argued could the governor really be given the constitu-
tional power to veto items. In deciding as the court did in this
case that the controlling board had no power to make such a
transfer since it would in effect be overruling the veto of the
governor and exercising the power of appropriation itself, the
court seemed to give-no heed to the argument of counsel men-
tioned above and did not even mention it in its opinion.
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The supreme court of Pennsylvania did hold, in Common-
wealth v. Barnett (I99 Pa. 161), that under a constitutional
provision of this kind the governor could reduce the amount
appropriated in an item as well as veto it altogether. Said the
court, "If the legislature by putting purpose, subject, and
amount inseparably together and calling it an item, can coerce
the governor to approve the whole or none, then the old evil is
revived which this section was meant to destroy. ** He was
entitled to approve of the object and disapprove as to the
amount." This seems to be the only case supporting such an
interpretation of the item veto provision. The general view was
expressed by the supreme court of Montana where in 1923,
in the "veto case" (69 Mont. 325), it said, "The supreme court
of a number of states which have constitutional provisions sim-
ilar or somewhat similar to our own have had occasion to pass
upon the subject directly or indirectly. Not one save Pennsyl-
vania has affirmed the right of a governor to scale an item in
an appropriation bill. ** Since the decision in Com. v. Barnett,
it has been commented on by many courts. The conclusion
reached by the majority in that court has not been followed
by any court." The Montana court suggests that in case the leg-
islature passes an omnibus bill without proper itemization the
remedy is for the governor to veto the whole bill and call the
legislature back in special session to pass the bill in a proper
form.
Other questions have arisen in regard to the constitutional
veto power. Is it a purely legislative power and as such must be
exercised while the legislature is in session? Is the power of
veto to be construed liberally as an affirmative power or con-
strued as a negative power and as such confined in its operation
strictly to the letter of the grant? These and other questions
have been discussed and show how difficult it is to encompass
an idea within the limit of words. The language of Art. II,
Sec. 16 seems simple and easily understood and yet as seen above
every sentence and almost every word has proved to be capable
of contrary interpretations.
